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Abstract: Throughout evolution, hominids have developed greater capacity to think about 
themselves in abstract and symbolic ways. This process has reached its apex in humans 
with the construction of a concept of self as a distinct entity with a personal history. 
This chapter provides a review of recent functional neuroimaging studies that have 
investigated the neural correlates of such “higher‑level” aspects of the human self, 
focusing in particular on processes that allow individuals to consciously represent 
and reflect on their own personal attributes (semantic forms of self‑knowledge) and 
experiences (episodic forms of self‑knowledge). These studies point to the medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC) as a key neural structure for processing various kinds of 
self‑referential information. We speculate that the MPFC may mediate dynamic 
processes that appraise and code the self‑relatedness or self‑relevance of information. 
This brain region may thus play a key role in creating the mental model of the self 
that is displayed in our mind at a given moment.
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INTRODUCTION
One great splitting of the whole universe into two halves is made by each 
of us; and for each of us almost all of the interest attaches to one of the 
halves; but we all draw the line of division between them in a different place. 
—William James, 1890, p. 289 
The great splitting William James refers to is the division of the world into “me” 
and “not‑me”.1 Such division between self and nonself is implemented in many systems, 
at various levels of complexity; simple living organisms and even some robots,2 have 
some sort of self‑models that allow them to distinguish between themselves and the 
external environment. Yet, among all known systems, it is undoubtedly in human beings 
that the sense of self has reached the highest level of refinement. The human sense of 
self comprises multiple facets or levels, from the consciousness of oneself as an agent 
and immediate subject of experience to the construction of a concept of oneself as a 
distinct entity with a personal history.3‑6 Although a complete understanding of the brain 
mechanisms that support these multiple dimensions of self is still currently out of reach, 
research in social cognitive neuroscience7 has made important progress in identifying 
the brain regions that are involved in representing and reflecting on different types of 
self‑referential information.
In this chapter, we review recent studies that have used functional neuroimaging 
techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission 
tomography (PET) to investigate the neural correlates of “higher‑level” self‑referential 
processes. By higher‑level self‑referential processes, we mean processes that allow an 
organism to consciously represent and reflect on its own attributes and experiences, what 
Damasio has called the “autobiographical self ”.5 We address more specifically functional 
neuroimaging studies that have investigated the neural basis of semantic and episodic 
forms of self‑knowledge. Our aim is not to provide an exhaustive review of all existing 
studies but rather to illustrate how functional neuroimaging has helped to better understand 
the brain mechanisms that contribute to creating the self/nonself distinction that William 
James referred to. It will be suggested, in particular, that the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC)a may play a key role in implementing this process.
REPRESENTING ONE’S PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: SEMANTIC 
FORMS OF SELF‑KNOWLEDGE
In comparison with simpler, unreflective forms of self‑awareness, the ability to 
think about oneself in abstract and symbolic ways is thought to have emerged late 
in evolution (perhaps in the Middle‑Upper Paleolithic transition, between 40,000 
a In this chapter, we use MPFC as a broad term to refer to the medial portion of the superior frontal gyrus, 
orbitofrontal gyrus and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (Brodmann’s areas 9, 10, 11 and 32). We use this 
general term because in many studies of self‑referential processing, activations along the medial part of 
the prefrontal cortex is quite extensive, encompassing several anatomically distinct subregions. It is likely, 
however, that different subregions within the MPFC support distinct functions in relation to self‑referential 
processing (see ref. 8), though this issue remains to be investigated in detail. 
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and 60,000 years ago, where we find instances of technological advances, art, body 
adornment and ritualistic burial) and it may be specifically human.9 Humans are able to 
consciously represent and reflect on their own personal attributes, such as their abilities 
and skills (e.g., “I can play guitar”), social roles (e.g., “I am a father”), psychological 
characteristics (e.g., “I am a shy person”) and preferences (e.g., “I like red wine”). This 
collection of information about ourselves (which is not necessarily accurate) constitutes 
the self‑concept, a complex knowledge structure stored in long‑term memory that 
includes abstract, summary representations of our own personal characteristics.10 Those 
self‑representations are semantic in nature in the sense that they have been abstracted 
from multiple experiences and can be accessed without the need to remember any 
specific past event.11,12
The experimental paradigm that has been most frequently used to study the neural 
correlates of semantic self‑knowledge consists of asking participants to represent and reflect 
on their own psychological traits. Kelley et al, for example, measured brain activity using 
fMRI while participants made different types of judgments on trait adjectives (e.g., polite, 
dependable, daring, talkative).13 In one condition, participants had to judge whether or 
not the adjectives described their own psychological traits (self condition), whereas in a 
second condition they had to judge whether or not the adjectives described the traits of 
George W. Bush (other condition). In a third condition, participants performed a shallow 
processing task consisting of judging whether the adjectives were printed in uppercase 
letters (case condition). The results showed that the two semantic judgments (i.e., the 
self and other conditions) were associated with greater activity in the left inferior frontal 
cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex relative to nonsemantic judgments (i.e., the case 
condition). More interestingly, there were also differences in activations between the two 
types of semantic judgments, with judgments about the self leading to greater activation 
in the MPFC than judgments about the other. An increased activation in the MPFC when 
reflecting on one’s own traits (compared to the traits of others or to making semantic 
judgments) has also been observed in several subsequent studies14‑26 (see Fig. 1 for an 
illustration of the MPFC activations detected in different studies).
In functional brain imaging studies, successful assignment of a specific cognitive 
process to the detected brain activation depends on the appropriate contrasting of task 
conditions. Because early studies of self‑referential processing used a public figure 
rather than a personally well‑known person for the comparison condition, it has been 
argued that the brain activations observed when making judgments about the self versus 
others may reflect differences in the amount and complexity of retrieved knowledge 
and/or differences in affective response rather than the self versus other distinction 
per se.27 To address this issue, Heatherton et al28 used a similar task as Kelley et al13 but the 
other‑referential condition involved a personally familiar other (i.e., one’s best friend) 
rather than a public figure. They found that the same MPFC region previously identified 
as more activated when thinking about the self versus a nonclose other was also more 
activated when thinking about the self versus an intimate other. Similar results have 
been obtained in most reports,15,29,30 although some studies failed to detect differential 
activity in the MPFC when contrasting judgments referring to the self with judgments 
referring to a close other.31,32 The reasons for these divergent findings remain unclear but 
a possible explanation would be that the difference in MPFC activity when contrasting 
self and close other conditions depends on the perceived similarity or overlap between 
oneself and close others, which in turn varies across individuals and situations. We will 
return to this point when discussing the possible function of the MPFC.
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The self‑concept comprises multiple self‑representations. People may hold distinct 
views of themselves across different contexts (e.g., in different relationships).33 
Furthermore, an important part of our self‑concept concerns our beliefs about how we 
are seen by others. Although our own beliefs about ourselves and about how we are seen 
by others reciprocally influence each other, these two types of self‑representations do 
not necessarily match.34 In a recent fMRI study,15 we investigated whether representing 
and reflecting on these two types of self‑representations recruit similar brain regions. To 
do so, we adapted the task used by Kelley et al by including four types of judgments. 
The first two conditions were similar to previous studies and required participants 
to judge the extent to which trait adjectives described their own personality (e.g., “Are 
you impatient?”) or the personality of a close friend (e.g., “Is Caroline impatient?”). In 
the other two conditions, participants were asked to estimate how their friend would 
judge the adjectives, with the target of the judgments again being either the self (e.g., 
“According to Caroline, are you impatient?”) or the other person (e.g., “According 
to Caroline, is she impatient?”). We found that the MPFC was more activated when 
making judgments about the self than when making judgments about the other, both 
Figure 1. MPFC activations associated with semantic forms of self‑knowledge. White circles represent the 
locations of peak MPFC activations detected when reflecting on one’s own psychological traits relative 
to reflecting on the traits of others or making semantic judgements.13‑23,25,26,29,30 White squares represent 
the locations of peak MPFC activations detected when reflecting on one’s own promotion goals.38‑41
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when participants made judgments from their own perspective and when they made 
judgments from the perspective of their friend. Interestingly, we also found that patients 
with Alzheimer disease presented less accurate self‑representations than healthy older 
adults and did not recruit the MPFC when making judgments about themselves (both 
when making the judgments from their own perspective and from the perspective of 
their relatives).35 These findings thus suggest that the MPFC may play an important 
role not only in representing and reflecting on our own self‑beliefs, but also in thinking 
about how we are seen by others.
Besides representations of personal traits, the self‑concept also includes knowledge 
about personal goals (i.e., future states of the self that one strives to achieve or avoid), 
which plays a key role in guiding and motivating behavior.36,37 The neural correlates of 
reflection on personal goals has been recently investigated by Johnson et al.38 During f 
MRI scanning, participants were instructed to think about their hopes and aspirations, 
about their duties and obligations and about nonself‑relevant topics (e.g., polar bear 
fishing). The results showed that some regions of the MPFC and posterior cingulate/
precuneus were more activated when thinking about personal goals than when thinking 
about nonself‑relevant topics. There were also distinct activations as a function of the 
type of personal goals considered: A region of MPFC showed greater activation when 
thinking about hopes and aspirations, whereas a posterior medial region showed greater 
activation when thinking about duties and obligations. Subsequent studies have detected 
similar activations in the MPFC when reflecting on personal goals, especially promotion 
goals (i.e., things the individual would like to achieve)39‑41 (see the location of squares 
on Fig. 1).
In summary, since the advent of functional brain imaging techniques, a growing 
interest has been devoted to the study of the neural correlates of semantic forms of 
self‑knowledge. Current data indicate that representing and reflecting on various kinds 
of self‑knowledge (such as our own beliefs about our psychological traits, our beliefs 
about how we are seen by others and our personal goals) typically induce greater activity 
in the MPFC compared to representing and reflecting on other individuals or processing 
the general (nonpersonal) meaning of the stimuli.
REPRESENTING ONESELF IN TIME: EPISODIC FORMS 
OF SELF‑KNOWLEDGE
A fascinating achievement of the human mind is its ability to temporarily disengage 
from the immediate environment to mentally revisit past experiences or imagine 
future ones.42‑44 Such “mental time travels” are associated with the subjective feeling 
of “re‑experiencing” the past or “pre‑experiencing” the future (e.g., “seeing” in one’s 
mind the location where a past event took place and the persons and objects that were 
present, remembering what one thought and felt at that time and so forth)45‑48 and may 
thus play a key role in providing the individual with a sense of personal continuity 
through time.44,49 Although semantic self‑knowledge is represented separately from (and 
thus can be accessed independently of ) episodic memory,12 representations of specific 
past and future experiences can constrain and nourish our beliefs about ourselves.50 For 
example, the belief that “I am a shy person” may be fostered by my memory of feeling 
uncomfortable and behaving awkwardly the last time I met new people at a party. An 
important function of mental time travel may therefore be to provide “episodic forms of 
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self‑knowledge”, that is, representations of specific personal experiences that support 
and constrain more abstract representations of the self.
The neural correlates of episodic forms of self‑knowledge have been mainly 
investigated in studies of autobiographical memory (for a review, see refs. 51‑53). 
In many of these studies, participants were asked to recall memories of specific past 
experiences (i.e., events that were specifically located in place and time and that 
lasted less than a day) in response to a series of cue words (e.g., vacation, dress). This 
autobiographical retrieval condition is typically compared to the retrieval of nonpersonal 
information (e.g., retrieving nonpersonal semantic knowledge or recalling stimuli that 
have been learned in the laboratory before the scanning session). Recent meta‑analyses 
indicate that autobiographical memory retrieval relies on a specific set of brain regions 
that includes the MPFC, regions in medial and lateral temporal cortices, the posterior 
cingulate/retrosplenial cortex and the inferior parietal lobe.54‑56 Notably, recent studies 
have shown that similar brain regions are also associated with the imagination of specific 
future events,57‑63 suggesting that common processes are involved in representing specific 
past and future events.42,43
Autobiographical memory and future thinking involve multiple component 
processes,42,43,64,65 and it is likely that different processes depend on distinct brain 
areas within the network described above. In a recent fMRI study,66 we sought to 
isolate the brain regions that are specifically related to self‑referential processes when 
representing specific future events. We asked participants to imagine future events 
that were relevant to their personal goals (personal future events; e.g., getting married 
next summer) and future events that were plausible and could be vividly imagined 
but were unrelated to their personal goals (nonpersonal future events; e.g., taking a 
pottery lesson next summer), as determined by individualized prescan interviews. 
As a control task, participants were asked to imagine routine activities (e.g., taking 
a shower), which involved the construction of mental representations of complex 
scenes but lacked the process of projecting oneself into the future. In line with other 
studies of episodic future thinking,57‑63 a network of brain regions that included the 
MPFC, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the inferior parietal lobe and the lateral 
temporal lobe was more activated when participants imagined personal future events 
(i.e., future events that were related to their personal goals) than when they imagined 
routine activities. Our main interest was then to directly contrast the imagination 
of personal and nonpersonal future events in order to isolate the brain regions that 
support personal goal processing during episodic future thought. This comparison 
revealed greater activation in the MPFC and PCC when imaging personal future events 
relative to nonpersonal future events. Importantly, these two types of future events 
were matched for vividness and temporal distance, suggesting that differences in 
brain activation cannot be accounted by these factors alone. The findings thus suggest 
that the MPFC and PCC may play a specific role in personal goal processing during 
episodic future thought.
In the same study, we also sought to investigate whether common brain regions 
were implicated in self‑referential processing across different functional domains. To 
this end, we isolated the brain regions that were associated with semantic forms of 
self‑knowledge in the same participants, using a task that involved making judgments 
about one’s own psychological traits (see the section on the semantic forms of 
self‑knowledge). We then looked at the overlap between brain activations related to 
this task and brain activations associated with self‑referential processing in the episodic 
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domain (i.e., imaging personal versus nonpersonal future events). Brain activations 
associated with the two tasks overlapped in the MPFC and PCC. These findings 
suggest that semantic and episodic forms of self‑knowledge may engage common 
self‑referential processes, which may in part be supported by the MPFC and PCC. In 
line with this view, a meta‑analysis of functional neuroimaging studies has revealed that 
cortical midline structures (i.e., the MPFC and the PCC/precuneus) were involved in 
processing self‑referential information across multiple cognitive domains and sensory 
modalities (e.g., the recognition of one’s own body and actions, self‑face recognition 
and the representation of one’s own traits).67
SELF‑REFERENTIAL PROCESSING AND THE “DEFAULT NETWORK”
The brain regions that are most frequently engaged during self‑referential tasks 
(i.e., the MPFC and PCC) are part of the brain’s “default network”, a network of areas 
that show decreased activity during a wide range of demanding cognitive tasks relative 
to passive resting or viewing states.68‑71 The precise function of the default network 
remains to be investigated in detail, but an interesting possibility is that this network 
mediates a number of processes that are ongoing during resting states and attenuated 
when resources are temporarily re‑allocated to the processing of a particular task.72,73 
The specific processes that are ongoing during resting states are probably manifold 
(e.g., the monitoring of external environment and body state, autobiographical retrieval, 
future thinking) and it is likely that different brain areas within the default network are 
involved in distinct processes.
In a PET study, we sought to investigate whether self‑referential processes occur 
during resting states and to determine whether common brain regions are engaged during 
resting states and intentional self‑reflection.14 To this end, scans were acquired while 
participants were asked to simply relax and not think in a systematic way (rest scans) or 
to focus their mental activity on specific topics pertaining either to the self (i.e., thinking 
about one’s own traits) or other topics (i.e., thinking about the traits of another person 
or about social issues). Importantly, subjects’ activity during the reflective tasks was 
exclusively internal (i.e., no stimuli were presented during the scans and no responses 
were required), so that the reflective and rest scans were closely matched in this respect. 
Immediately after each scan, subjects were asked to verbally report the thoughts, images, 
feelings, sensations and memories that they experienced during the scan and they also 
rated different dimensions of their subjective experience using rating scales (e.g., the 
amount of self‑referential thoughts, the amount of thoughts about other individuals). 
The data revealed that participants spontaneously experienced a substantial amount of 
self‑referential thoughts during rest scans. We then investigated brain regions that were 
commonly activated during rest and intentional self‑referential processing relative to the 
other tasks and found common activation in the MPFC. Furthermore, across all conditions, 
we found that the degree of activity in MPFC correlated with self‑reported amount of 
self‑referential thoughts; on the other hand, there was no correlation with the amount of 
thoughts concerning others. These findings thus suggest that some sort of self‑referential 
processes spontaneously occur during so‑called resting conditions and that such processes 
are associated with MPFC activity.
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A POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE MPFC IN SELF‑REFERENTIAL 
PROCESSING
As we have seen, activation of the MPFC has been repeatedly observed in association 
with tasks that require to process information in reference to oneself. There is currently 
no consensual view, however, regarding the precise nature of the cognitive processes that 
are supported by this brain region. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide 
a comprehensive review of the various processes that have been linked to the MPFC, it 
is important to note that the question of whether or not this brain region plays a specific 
role in self‑referential processing is debated. Some authors have argued that although the 
MPFC supports processes that are recruited when one is considering information about 
the self (e.g., when making judgments about one’s personal characteristics), the nature 
of these processes may have nothing to do with the self per se and may instead consist 
of nonself‑specific processes, such as inferential processing and memory retrieval, for 
example.27,74 On the other hand, other researchers have suggested that the MPFC may 
play some specific role in self‑referential processing.8,28,29,67,75,76 It has been suggested, 
in particular, that the MPFC may support supramodal processes that, explicitly or 
implicitly, appraise and code the self‑relatedness or self‑relevance of multiple sources of 
information.8,67,76 According to this view, the MPFC may mediate dynamic processes that 
locate external stimuli and internal representations on a continuum of personal relevance. 
In line with this hypothesis, there is evidence that activity in the MPFC increases linearly 
with increased ratings of self‑relevance of stimuli.75,77 A recent study by Moran et al78 
further suggests that the MPFC signals the personal relevance of incoming information 
even in the absence of explicit requirements for self‑reflection (i.e., during passive 
viewing conditions).
We have recently speculated that by processing degrees of self‑relevance or 
self‑relatedness, the MPFC might sustain the process of identifying oneself with versus 
distancing oneself from particular mental contents (e.g., thoughts, opinions, preferences), 
which would therefore be regarded as “me” (or “mine”) versus “not‑me” (or “not‑mine”).29 
The MPFC might thus contribute to the great splitting of the universe made by each of 
us that William James referred to more than a century ago.1 Of course, we agree that 
the creation of our sense of self involves multiple nonself‑specific processes, such as 
memory and reasoning processes.27,74 These nonself‑specific processes rely on multiple 
brain regions, including medial and lateral temporal cortices, the posterior cingulate cortex 
and the lateral prefrontal cortex, which are involved in acquiring, retrieving and using 
information (whether it be about the self, others or the world). Our suggestion, however, 
is that the MPFC might play a role in processing the self‑relatedness or self‑relevance 
of information that is represented in other “high‑level” or “low‑level” brain regions. 
Representations that elicit high activity in the MPFC might be those that constitute the 
mental model of the self that is displayed in our mind at a given moment (“the working 
self”).10 In this section, we discuss evidence that we think supports this hypothesis.
If the MPFC is involved in processing self‑relevance or self‑relatedness, then factors 
that diminish the perceived degree of self‑relatedness of information should modulate 
neural activity in the MPFC accordingly. Recent studies that have examined the effects 
of temporal perspective on the neural correlates of self‑referential processing suggest that 
this is indeed the case. Some philosophers have suggested that a person is a succession 
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of overlapping but different selves,79 and research in social psychology has revealed that 
when people feel they have changed, they tend to distance themselves from psychologically 
remote former selves, which are then regarded as “other persons”.80‑82 Someone may, 
for example, have a mental model of who she was five years ago (e.g., knowing that she 
was shy) but may no longer identify herself with that model. Although she can recognize 
that the person to whom the mental model refers to was herself, she no longer identifies 
that model as “me” (i.e., her current self) because she feels she has changed (e.g., she 
feels she is not shy anymore). We recently found that activity in the MPFC is sensitive 
to these effects of temporal perspective.29 Specifically, we asked participants to reflect 
on their own psychological traits and those of an intimate other, for both the present 
life period (i.e., at college) and a past life period (i.e., high school years) that involved 
significant personal changes. The MPFC was commonly recruited by the four reflective 
tasks (reflecting on the present self, past self, present other and past other), relative to 
a control condition (making valence judgments), suggesting that this brain region may 
play a general role in reflecting on mental states and psychological characteristics.83 
Importantly, however, the degree of activity in MPFC also varied significantly according 
to the target of reflection, this region being recruited to a greater extent when reflecting 
on the present self than when reflecting on the past self and when reflecting on the other 
person; thinking about the past self and thinking about the other person were associated 
with similar levels of activity in the MPFC (see Fig. 2). This study thus demonstrates that 
increasing the psychological distance of self‑representations leads to diminished activity 
in the MPFC, such that the degree of activity associated with thinking about oneself is 
similar to the degree of activity associated with thinking about others.
In a subsequent study,84 we replicated and extended these findings, by showing that 
differences in MPFC activity when thinking about current versus temporally distant 
selves are symmetrical between the past and the future. Specifically, participants showed 
higher activity in the MPFC when making judgments about their present self than when 
making judgments about themselves five years ago or five years from now; there was no 
difference between past and future selves. Importantly, these findings could not simply 
Figure 2. The effect of temporal perspective on MPFC activity when thinking about oneself and others. 
The left panel shows a region of MPFC in which activity was modulated by adopting different temporal 
perspectives on the self and others. As can be seen on the right panel, the MPFC was recruited to 
a greater extent when reflecting on the present self than when reflecting on the past self and when 
reflecting on the other person; thinking about the past self and thinking about the other person were 
associated with similar levels of activity. Adapted from reference 29.
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be accounted for in terms of task difficulty or memory retrieval, suggesting that the 
critical factor that underlies the effects of temporal perspective on MPFC activity relates 
to feelings of connectedness to self‑representations. Research has further showed that 
individual differences in perceived connectedness to future selves and its neural signature 
(i.e., MPFC activity) hold important implications for decision making, such as choosing 
whether to save for the future or spend in the present.85,86
Other studies suggest that the degree of MPFC activity when thinking about others 
depends on the perceived similarity or degree of overlap between oneself and the other 
person under consideration. As we have seen, although judgments about oneself versus 
a nonclose other have been repeatedly associated with greater activation in MPFC, the 
studies that have directly compared judgments about the self versus a close other have 
provided mixed results (see the section on semantic forms of self‑knowledge). These 
findings can be seen as supporting the view that the MPFC is not involved in self‑referential 
processing per se but instead supports nonself‑specific processes (e.g., familiarity 
processing, memory retrieval), which would be engaged to different extents when making 
judgments about oneself, close others and nonclose others.27,74 The modulation of MPFC 
activity as a function of closeness with others can be interpreted differently, however. As 
already noted by William James,1 people’s identities include not only elements that are 
unambiguously part of them (e.g., their body and mental states) but also outer aspects of 
their lives, such as their family, friends and possessions. Extensive research has indeed 
shown that people treat the resources, perspectives and identities of close others as their 
own (think, for example, about how you react when a loved one is mistreated) and these 
effects depend on the degree to which the individual has included the other person in the 
self.87 The fact that the magnitude of activation in the MPFC is more similar between the 
self and close others than between the self and nonclose others may thus reflect differences 
in degrees of inclusion of others in the sense of self.
Recent studies that have explored cultural differences in the neural correlates of 
self‑referential processing are consistent with this interpretation. East Asian cultures 
promote collectivistic self‑views more than Western cultures, emphasizing the 
interconnectedness rather than separateness between the self and close others.88 Zhu et al 
measured brain activity using fMRI while Western and Chinese participants judged trait 
adjectives in reference to the self, their mother or a public person.30 The results showed 
that the MPFC was more activated in the self condition than in the public person condition 
for both Western and Chinese participants. The comparison between mother and public 
figure differed between groups, however, with MPFC being more activated for the close 
versus public other in Chinese but not Western subjects. Furthermore, Western participants 
showed increased activations in the MPFC when thinking about the self versus their 
mother, whereas there was no difference between self and mother in Chinese participants. 
This study therefore demonstrates that differences in MPFC activity between self and 
a close other is modulated by cultural differences in the degree of inclusion of intimate 
others in the sense of self.
There is also evidence that inferring the mental states of unfamiliar individuals that are 
perceived as similar to the self engages the MPFC more than inferring the mental states of 
unfamiliar individuals that are perceived as dissimilar.19,89,90 For example, Mitchell et al90 had 
participants read descriptions of an unfamiliar individual whose social and political views 
were similar to their own views and descriptions of another unfamiliar individual whose 
social and political views were dissimilar. Then, during fMRI scanning, participants had to 
infer the opinions, likes and dislikes of these two target persons. The results showed that the 
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ventral MPFC was more engaged during judgments of the individual who was perceived as 
similar to the self than during judgments of the individual who was perceived as dissimilar. 
Furthermore, correlation analyses revealed that the more participants considered themselves 
similar to the “similar” other, the greater the difference in ventral MPFC activation during 
judgments of similar versus dissimilar other. These findings clearly demonstrate that the 
extent to which the MPFC is engaged when thinking about others depends on the degree 
of perceived similarity of the other person to oneself.
According to the view defended here, the MPFC may not be involved in making 
fixed and rigid self/nonself distinctions, but may instead mediate dynamic processes that 
locate information on a continuum of self‑relevance or self‑relatedness. The distinction 
between self and nonself may thus be a matter of degree and what is regarded as the “self” 
may vary across time and situations, depending on what information one identifies with 
at a given moment (i.e., what one includes in the currently activated self‑concept).10 This 
hypothesis predicts that, depending on contextual factors, the same information could 
be included in versus excluded from the current mental model of the self and this should 
be reflected in MPFC activity.
A recent study suggests that this is indeed the case, showing that priming cultural 
values of individualism versus collectivism in bicultural individuals induces increased 
activity in the MPFC for culturally congruent self‑judgments.91 Behavioral studies have 
shown that people of individualistic cultures tend to think about themselves using general 
self‑descriptions (e.g., I am honest), whereas people from collectivistic cultures tend to 
think about themselves using more contextual self‑descriptions (e.g., when talking to my 
mother, I am honest). Research has also shown that when primed to orient more toward 
either an individualistic or collectivistic schema, people will think about themselves in a 
way that is consistent with the cultural schema temporarily brought to mind. Chiao et al91 
investigated whether neural activity when making self‑referential judgments would be 
influenced by such cultural priming. Participants were Asian‑Americans living in the United 
States who identified themselves as bicultural as assessed by a questionnaire. They were 
asked to make judgments about general self‑descriptions, contextual self‑descriptions and a 
control task (judgments about font style). Before doing those tasks, half of the participants 
received priming procedures designed to activate individualistic cultural schemas (e.g., 
thinking about what make them different from their family and friends), whereas the other 
half received priming procedures designed to activate collectivistic cultural schemas (e.g., 
thinking about what they have in common with their family and friends). The authors found 
a significant interaction between priming conditions and types of self‑judgments in the 
MPFC. Specifically, participants primed with individualism showed greater activation in 
the MPFC for general relative to contextual self‑descriptions, whereas individuals primed 
with collectivism showed greater activation in the same regions for contextual relative 
to general self‑descriptions. Furthermore, across all participants, the degree of cultural 
priming of individualistic or collectivistic values was associated with the degree of MPFC 
response to general or contextual self‑descriptions, respectively. This study thus suggests 
that the response of the MPFC to a particular self‑description depends on whether or not 
this information is congruent with the self‑concept activated at a given moment.
In summary, recent functional neuroimaging studies have shown that a) the degree 
of activity in the MPFC when thinking about oneself diminishes when the psychological 
distance of self‑representations increases, b) the degree of activity in the MPFC when 
thinking about others depends on the extent to which the other person is included in 
one’s sense of self and c) the response of the MPFC to particular self‑definitions depends 
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on whether or not these definitions are congruent with temporarily activated cultural 
values. Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the MPFC may 
mediate dynamic processes that locate information on a continuum of self‑relevance 
or self‑relatedness. Information that is located at the upper end of this continuum may 
be incorporated in the mental model of the self that is displayed in our mind at a given 
moment, thereby being subjectively considered to be part of “me” or “mine”.
CONCLUSION
Throughout evolution, hominids have developed greater capacity to think about the 
self in abstract and symbolic ways. This process has reached its apex in humans with the 
construction of a concept of oneself as a distinct entity with a personal history. Humans 
are able to consciously represent and reflect on their own personal attributes (e.g., their 
abilities, social roles, psychological characteristics and preferences) and frequently 
engage in mental time travels to mentally revisit their past experiences or imagine future 
ones. Recent studies that have used functional neuroimaging techniques to investigate 
the neural correlates of these self‑referential processes point to the MPFC as a critical 
neural structure for processing both semantic and episodic forms of self‑knowledge. 
A key function of this brain region may be to appraise and code the self‑relatedness or 
self‑relevance of information. Mental representations (e.g., traits, opinions, preferences, 
experiences) may be located on a continuum of self‑relatedness, depending on the 
degree of activity they elicit in MPFC. Information that is located at the upper end of 
this continuum may be incorporated in the mental model of the self that is currently 
displayed in our mind, thereby being subjectively considered as “me” or “mine”. The 
MPFC may thus implement dynamic neural processes that contribute to the division of 
the world into “me” and “not‑me” that each of us subjectively experience. Recent studies 
that have examined the effects of cultural values and temporal perspectives on the neural 
correlates of self‑referential processing are consistent with this proposal. The neuroscience 
of self‑referential processing is still in its infancy, however, and additional investigations 
are needed to develop a full understanding of this aspect of human experience.
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